Abstract. We combine household surveys and national accounts, as well as recently released tax data in a systematic way to track the dynamics of Indian income inequality from 1922 to 2014. According to our benchmark estimates, the share of national income accruing to the top 1% income earners is now at its highest level since the creation of the Indian Income tax in 1922. The top 1% of earners captured less than 21% of total income in the late 1930s, before dropping to 6% in the early 1980s and rising to 22% today. Over the 1951-1980 period, the bottom 50% group captured 28% of total growth and incomes of this group grew faster than the average, while the top 0.1% incomes decreased. Over the 1980-2014 period, the situation was reversed; the top 0.1% of earners captured a higher share of total growth than the bottom 50% (12% vs. 11%), while the top 1% received a higher share of total growth than the middle 40% (29% vs. 23%). These findings suggest that much can be done to promote more inclusive growth in India. Our results also appear to be robust to a range of alternative assumptions seeking to address data limitations. Most importantly, we stress the need for more democratic transparency on income and wealth statistics to avoid another "black decade" similar to the 2000s, during which India entered the digital age but stopped publishing tax statistics. Such data sources are key to track the long run evolution of inequality and to allow an informed democratic debate on inequality.
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India introduced an individual income tax with the Income Tax Act of 1922, under the British colonial administration. From this date, up to the turn of the 20th century, the Indian Income Tax Department produced income tax tabulations, making it possible to track the long-run evolution of top incomes in a systematic manner. Using this data, Banerjee and Piketty (2005) showed that the share of fiscal income accruing to the top 1% earners shrank substantially from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, from about 13% of fiscal income, to less than 5% in the early 1980s.
The trend was reversed in the mid-1980s, when pro-business, market deregulation policies were implemented. The share of fiscal held of the top 1% doubled from approximately 5% to 10% in 2000.
According to National Accounts estimates, post-2000 income growth has been substantially higher than in the previous decades. Average annual real income growth was below 2% in the 1960 and 1970s, it reached 2.5% in the 1980s and 2% in the 1990s 1 . Since 2000s it is of 4.4% on average since 2000 ( Figure 1 ).
Little is known however on the distributional impacts of economic policies in India after 2000 in part because the Income Tax Department stopped publishing income tax statistics in 2000, and also because self-reported survey data does not provide adequate information concerning the top of the distribution (fiscal data is not perfect either, but it delivers higher and more plausible income levels for the top).
In 2016, the Income Tax Department released tax tabulations for recent years (2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14) , making it possible to revise and update previously published top income estimates and better inform public debates on growth and income inequality. We find that the bottom 50% group grew at a substantially lower rate than average growth (Figure 1a ) since the 1980s. Middle 40% grew at a slower rate than the average (Figure 1b) . On the contrary, top 10% and top 1% grew substantially faster than the average since 1980 (Figure 1c ).
The first objective of this paper is to mobilize this newly released set of tax data in order to track the evolution of income inequality from 1922 to 2014. The second objective is to go beyond top income shares and produce estimates of income dynamics throughout the entire distribution using concepts that are consistent with National Accounts (following, as much as possible, the Distributional National Accounts Methodology, see Alvaredo et al., 2016) . India: full population vs. bottom 50% income group, 1951 India: full population vs. bottom 50% income group, -2014 Source: Authors' computations using tax and survey data and national accounts. 40% income group, 1951-2014 Source: Authors' computations using tax and survey data and national accounts. India: full population vs. top 1% and top 10% income groups, 1951-2014 Source: Authors' computations using tax and survey data and national accounts.
Figure 1a -National income growth in

Figure 1c -National income growth in
To do so, we combine in a systematic manner household survey, fiscal and national accounts data. Such an exercise is fraught with methodological and conceptual difficulties given the lack of consistent historical income inequality data in India. Indeed, the tax data available only covers the very top of the distribution of Indian earners (more than 6% of total population in 2014). In addition, the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) household surveys measure consumption rather than income. We repeatedly stress that there are strong limitations to available data sources, and that more democratic transparency on income and wealth statistics is highly needed in India. That said, we find that our key results are robust to a large set of alternative assumptions made to address data gaps. The present paper should be viewed as an exercise in transparency: we propose a method to combine the different available sources (in particular national accounts, tax and survey data) in the most possible transparent way, and we very much hope that new data sources will become available in the future so that more refined estimates can be constructed. All our computer codes are available on-line so that everybody can use them and contribute to improve the methods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the Indian income inequality data gap of the past two decades, section 2 describes our data sources and methodology, section 3 presents our key findings, section 4 briefly discusses their policy relevance and section 5 concludes. 1966-77 and 1980-1984) prolonged these policies and implemented a highly progressive tax system.
In the early 1970s, the top marginal income tax rate reached record high levels (up to 97.5%).
From the mid 1980s onwards, liberalization and trade openness became recurrent themes among Indian policymakers. The Seventh Plan (1985 Plan ( -1990 , led by Rajiv Gandhi (1984 Gandhi ( -1989 , promoted the relaxation of market regulation, with increased external borrowing and increased imports. The tax system was also gradually transformed, with top marginal income tax rates falling to 50% in the mid-1980s. In the late 1980s, when India faced a balance of payment crisis, it called for International Monetary Fund assistance. Financial support was conditioned to structural reforms which pushed forward the deregulation and liberalization agenda.
What came to be known as the first set of economic reforms (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) placed the promotion of the private sector at the heart of economic policies, via denationalizations, disinvestment of the public sector, deregulation (dereservation and delicencing of public companies and industries) 2 . These reforms were implemented both by the Congress government of N. Rao (1991 Rao ( -1996 and its successors, including the conservative Janata Party government of A. Vajpayee (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . The reforms were prolonged after 2000, under the 10th and 2 Economic policies also seeked to rationalize the public sector, its branches now had to pursue the objectives of profitability and efficiency. The opening of imports, exchange rate floating regime and banking, capital market opening were also implemented.
subsequent five-year plans. These plans ended government fixation of petrol, sugar or fertilizer prices and led to further privatizations, in the agricultural sector in particular.
The impacts of these reforms in terms of growth has been praised by public authorities. Real per adult national income growth, which has more sense from the point of view of individual incomes than commonly used GDP 3 , significantly increased after the reforms. It was 0.7% in the 1970s, 2.5% in the 1980s, 2.0% in the 1990s and 4.4% since 2000 (Figure 1 ). However, little is known on the distributional characteristics of post-2000 growth.
The income inequality data gap
Public debate over liberalization policies largely focused on their macroeconomic impacts (Ramaswami, Kotwal, Wadhwa, 2011) and on the impacts on poverty, with a substantial reduction in poverty rates 4 (World Bank, 2017; Deaton & Dreze, 2002; Deaton & Kozel, 2005) . How the Indian economy fared in terms of inequality has been arguably less discussed. This can partly be explained by a lack of consistent data on the distribution of incomes or wealth for the recent period.
Some evidence suggesting a rise in income inequality in India after the turn of the century can however be found in NSSO surveys and other sources available in openly-available sources. Figure 2 presents the share of total consumption attributable to the top 20% of consumers, available online from the World Bank and United Nations WIDER World Income Inequality Database (UN-WIDER WIID). The data shows a decrease in top quintile consumption share from the fifties to the seventies from around 43% to 40% and an increase thereafter (in line with Banerjee and Piketty findings) to close to 44%. There are important irregularities with the data, but the overall "U-shape" trend seems relatively consistent 5 .
3 Net national income is equal to GDP minus depreciation of fixed capital plus net foreign incomes. 4 The share of Indians under the $1.9 poverty line went from 45.9% in 1993 45.9% in to 21.2% in 2011 45.9% in (PovcalNet, 2017 The shortcomings of household survey data in monitoring the evolution of inequality are well known; because of underreporting and undersampling issues, surveys fail to properly capture inequality dynamics at the top of the distribution Piketty, 2007, 2010) . What is more, NSSO surveys only focus on consumption rather than income and the distributional dynamics of these two concepts can differ notably. In addition, the relatively limited magnitude of the changes observed in NSSO data calls for care in the interpretation of such results.
Consumption data available through surveys constitutes part of the evidence, but are not sufficient to inform debates on Indian inequality.
Other data sources, such as Forbes' Indian Rich lists, suggest an important increase in the wealth of the richest Indians after 2000 (see Figure 3 ). The wealth of the richest Indians reported in Forbes' India Rich List, amounted to less than 2% of National income in the 1990sn, but increased substantially throughout the 2000s, reaching 10% in 2015 and with a peak of 27% before the 2008-9 financial crisis. Such data suggests a rise in wealth inequality levels throughout the post-2000 period, but does not enable a consistent analysis of income inequality over the long run. This is confirmed by simple simulations using a fixed normalized wealth distribution and taking into account rising average nominal wealth over the period (unfortunately Indian wealth data is very limited so it is difficult to go further). The exact reason why Indian tax administration stopped publishing data in 2000 remains unknown. One potential explanation for this is the change in the sampling method employed in the late 1990s, with a resulting loss in the precision of estimates. Indeed, official tax tabulations were based on the entire population until the early 1990s -or based on stratified samples with sampling rates close to 100 percent for top incomes as is the case in most OECD countries, but seem to be based on uniform samples of all tax returns after this period and up to 2000 (Banerjee and Piketty, 2005) . The latter method led to less precise results 10 . Another potential explanation for the halt in tax reporting could just be the lack of interest in income statistics and inequality (which given the rise in top income shares observed from mid 1980s to 2000 seems rather surprising).
Interestingly enough, the number income tax payers in India has increased substantially over the past decades. Less than 0.5% of the population filing tax returns up to the 1950s, between 0.2 and 1% over the period between 1960 to 1990, before a substantial increase thereafter; from 1% to close to 3% in the late 1990s and more than 6% in the latest period ( Figure 4 ) 11 . This increase over twenty years is impressive, yet comparatively, the current figure is similar to the levels observed in France and in the USA in the late 1910s, and much lower than the levels observed in the interwar period (about 10-15%) and in the decades following World War 2 (50% or more) in these two countries (Piketty, 2001; Piketty and Saez, 2003) . With revenues from income tax equivalent to approximately 2% of GDP, India receives more revenue than China (1%), but significantly less than other emerging countries such as Brazil and Russia (4%), and South Africa and the OECD countries (9%) (OECD, 2017) .
Figure 4 -Evolution of the proportion of income-tax taxpayers in India
Source: Authors' computations using data from Indian Income Tax Departement and UN population data.
2.1.2
NSSO consumption data Number of taxpayers in India, 1922 India, -2014 Since the first survey rounds, NSSO produced 30 days reference period estimates.
This period is known as the Universal Reference Period. Post-1990, concerns were raised about the sensitivity of the reference period on the estimates and NSSO started publishing alternative reference periods (7 days and 365 days). As Deaton and Kozel (2005) note, shorter recall periods tend to lead to higher consumption estimates. However, experiments carried out with different reference periods by the NSSO working group concerned concluded that there is no clear superiority of a period over another. We thus use the Universal Reference Period. This choice is also motivated by the fact that the 30 days period is the only one that is consistent throughout the entire period of analysis .
For recent years (1983 to 2011) we use quinquennial rounds 38 (1983), 43 (1987-88), 50 (1993-94), 55 (1999-2000) , 61(2004-05), 66 (2009-10) . Micro data at the household level was obtained from the NSSO. For earlier rounds (rounds 3 to 32), for which we could not access micro data files, we use the Poverty and Growth in India Database of the World Bank (Ozler et al., 1996) (Blanchet and Chancel, 2016) . Before 1950, we use historical National Income growth rates from Sivasubramonian (2000) .
A well know puzzle in Indian statistics (Deaton and Kozel, 2005; CSO, 2008) pertains to the difference in survey consumption growth rates and national accounts growth rates, particularly during the recent period. Figure 5 shows the total growth rate of Net National Income and Household Final Consumption
Expenditure from NAS and personal consumption from NSSO, from 1983 to 2011.
According to NAS, national income grew at 475% and household consumption grew at slightly more than 300%, while NSSO data indicates that household consumption grew at 200%. 13 In the 1990s we observe noticeable differences between real GDP growth estimates obtained from UN SNA and those reported by the World Bank (see Appendix 1). and under-sampling of top incomes in survey data (Banerjee and Piketty, 2005) .
We should stress from the outset that we do not pretend to solve this complex issue. The divergence probably involves several, if not all of the factors above cited.
14 When correcting for imputed rents the Central Statistical Organization (2008) finds a large and growing share of total consumption remains unexplained. Total real growth rate in India, 1983 India, -2011 National income (Nat. Accounts) Household consumption (Nat. Accounts)
Household consumption (NSSO)
What we seek here is to better estimate the fraction of the difference that can be explained by the absence of top earners in survey data. We do not think that this factor alone can explain the entire gap, as it has sometime been suggested (Lakner and Milanovic, 2015 The IHDS is one of the very few surveys estimating both consumption and income in India. This is particularly useful as it enables a tentative reconstruction of NSSO unobserved income levels, using IHDS information. We describe this methodology in section 2.2.2. IHDS micro data is also openly available via the ICPSR website, which makes it particularly convenient 16 .
UN statistics population data
We define the theoretical population of tax payers as the total number of adult individuals in India. We use adult population data from UN Population Prospects (2015) from 1950 to today. UN Population prospects provide 5-year age range annual population tables, based on national census and their own estimation procedures. The adult population is defined as the number of individuals over age 20. Before 1950, we use total population estimates from Sivasubramonian (2000) and reconstruct the adult population using total population growth rates given by the same author. Figure 4 , tax data in India is only reliable above the p94 threshold for the recent period and above the p99.9
threshold when we go backwards in time.
Estimation of bottom survey incomes
One of the main difficulties of our exercise is related to the fact that NSSO does not include questions on individual and/or household income. Our strategy consists of using observed income-consumption profiles in IHDS data to reconstruct income profiles from NSSO consumption data. We first estimate income and consumption levels for each generalized percentile of the distribution of income and consumption given by IHDS data. For each survey and each percentile of the distribution, we construct observed income-consumption ratios α1p=yp/cp, with yp and cp respectively with a mean income and consumption within quantile p. We call this strategy A1. To obtain a theoretical income-consumption profile over percentiles, we take average of years 2005 and 2011-12. In practice, the two profiles differ only marginally. We then construct two alternative ratios, α2p
and α0p, referred to as strategies A2 and A0 respectively. In strategy A2, we assume that α2p= 1 for α1p≤1 and α2p=α1p otherwise. This second strategy is equal to assuming no negative savings rates among the poor. In strategy A0, we define α0p=(α1p+α2p)/2 for α1p≤1. This strategy assumes that there can be negative savings rates, remittances or household transfers, but that the true αp value lies between strategy A1 and strategy A2. Income consumption ratios for the different strategies are presented in Appendix 4. We find that these different strategies have no effect on the trends we observe and a limited impact on top share estimates, as we show in section 3.4.
The choice of these different strategies indeed impacts on the estimated share of total savings in the economy. In strategy A1 total savings are close to 0, which seems too low compared to the current rate of savings in India (about 30%).
This figure is close to 5% in strategy A0 and approximately 10% in strategy A2.
These values are more or less constant throughout the entire period covered whereas in National accounts they move from about 10% in the 1960s to 30%
today. However, using strategy A0 and factoring in top incomes in the analysis allows us to find an aggregate savings rate of the same order of magnitude as those observed today (see Appendix 5).
2.2.3
Interpolating survey and tax data for missing years.
Our objective is to produce yearly estimate for the full distribution from 1951 to 2014. Given that survey or tax data is not available for all years, it is necessary to interpolate tax and/or survey data for a certain number of years. In order to do so, we interpolate missing years using a constant growth rate between known intervals t and t+N 18 .
As described in sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.4, we have two available sources for the estimation of survey income for the years 2005 and 20010-11, NSSO and IHDS.
However, the trends observed in the surveys are somehow divergent. The ratio of reconstructed NSSO total income to total personal income from national accounts decreases, while the ratio of IHDS total income to total personal income from national accounts is stable. The choice of one or the other source of data has implications on our final inequality statistics: using IHDS means for the estimation of the bottom of the distribution (strategy B1) yields a lower rise in top income shares than when using the NSSO survey (strategy B2). However, using NSSO mechanically accentuates the rise in top shares over the period and the strategy B1
18 In practice, for each average income at percentile p of the survey (or tax) distribution, we define ypt+1=ypt×g where g=(ypt+N/ypt) 1/N , with g the growth rate, ypt+1 the average income at percentile p and year t+1.
is therefore used as our benchmark, as it represents the conservative approach. 
Combination of tax and survey data
Several strategies can be used to correct for missing top incomes in survey data. These include the modification of the weights assigned to top earners in household surveys, the addition of extra observations of top earners or the multiplication of income levels at the top (Burkhauser et al, 2016) , and each has its own strengths and weaknesses. We think that an acceptable method should be consistent, in producing distributions with plausible statistics, in particular, the shape of inverted Pareto beta coefficients curves should be relatively smooth. The method followed should also be transparent, in so-much as it should provide a statistical outcome that could be anticipated from an economic perspective; survey inequality should in principle increase when we factor in top fiscal incomes.
Furthermore, a simple strategy would also be better than a complex one.
Our preferred strategy is to assume that surveys are reliable from the bottom of the distribution up to a certain percentile and that tax data is reliable after another. In practice, this amounts to multiplying income of the top percentiles in the survey by a certain factor, given by tax data. More precisely: we suppose that survey data is reliable from p0 to p1 -this means that between p0 and p1, averages and thresholds are given by the distribution of interpolated (estimated) survey income. In our benchmark scenario, which we refer to as strategy C1, p1=p90. We also test alternative ranges: (i) p1=p95, which we refer to as strategy C2
and (ii) p1=p80, referred to as strategy C3. As shown in section 3.4, these different strategies have no impacts on the recent and long term income trends observed in
India and have only a moderate impact on income concentration levels.
We then suppose that tax data is reliable from a certain percentile, p2, up to the top of the distribution. p2 is given by the population share under the first taxable bracket observed in the tax data. This value varies from p2=99.9 in the 1950s to p2=95.5 in the 2010s 19 . Therefore, our strategy implies that averages and thresholds for all percentiles above p2 are given by the distribution interpolated from observed tax data. Appendix 5 gives the precise value of p2 for each year.
Between p1 and p2, we test several strategies for the progression of income levels and thresholds at a given point of time. We define a convex junction profile (strategy D1), a linear profile (strategy D2) and a concave profile (strategy D3). We adopt D1 (convex profile) as our benchmark strategy as it corresponds to the profile observed for recent years, for which we have more observed fiscal data at the top; more than 6% of the population against 0.1% for the earlier period (see Appendix 6). We find that these different strategies have negligible impacts on top share results. In fact, the bulk of the correction we apply to survey incomes occurs above p2, not between p1 and p2.
From total fiscal income to national income
Total fiscal income is the total personal income that would be reported by individuals or tax units, if all of them reported their revenues to the tax administration. In the case of India, we do not observe this value because of the limited tax base. One way to recover it, following Atkinson (2007) , is to start from the sum of primary incomes obtained by households reported in national accounts and operate a series of deductions and additions towards a definition closer to taxable income. This is the approach followed by Banerjee and Piketty (2005) and appears appropriate given that their focus was restricted to top incomes only. By construction, total fiscal income evolves at the same rate as pre-tax national income under this approach
The other approach consists of reconstructing total fiscal income via the combination of top fiscal incomes and observed (or estimated) survey income, as we detailed in the previous section. This is equivalent to assuming that tax data give true fiscal incomes for individuals over p2 and that estimated survey data gives the true fiscal incomes for individuals below p1. In this approach, reconstructed fiscal income and total national income can evolve at a different 19 In Indian tax files, there is a non-negligible proportion of filers falling below the first taxable bracket.
pace. Over the years, we observe a growing gap between reconstructed total income from surveys and total national income (see Appendix 7). This divergence is the repercussion of the gap between household consumption surveys and national accounts discussed in section 2.1.3. We show in section 3.4 that we can account for a non-negligeable share of this gap after the combination of survey and tax data , but that a large part of the difference remains unexplained.
In order to produce income estimates comparable to other countries, we chose to rescale our fiscal income estimates to match total pre-tax national income from national accounts. In practice, we preserve the distribution obtained from the combination of tax and survey data and simply rescale average and threshold levels of all percentile groups by a yearly factor so that we match total national income.
In further work, we intend to distribute retained earnings to the top of the distribution following the DINA guidelines (Alvaredo et al, 2016) . This would most likely increase the level of inequality in the recent period, since the growth of retained earnings is likely to be concentrated among top earners. The amount by which our results would vary presumably remains limited though. Indeed, assuming retained earnings are equal to 10% of national income, distributing half of them to the top 1% would increase its share by about 1 percentage point.
Definition of a benchmark scenario
The combination of our different strategies defines 54 scenarios (3 A scenarios x 2 B scenarios x 3 C scenarios x 3 D scenarios). We stress that most of the combinations of scenarios among these 54 possibilities can be a priori justified, and as such, we provide results for all corresponding series in our data appendix. We see our benchmark scenario (A0B1C1D1) as being at the same time plausible and conservative compared to most of the scenarios tested, as top income shares are lower than in most scenario and also increase at a slower rate over the recent decades. Robustness tests are presented in section 3.4.
RESULTS
Sharp rise in top income shares since the mid-1980s
Our results exhibit a strong rise in top income shares since the mid-1980s. In our benchmark estimation scenario, the share of national income attributable to the top top 1% reached 21.7% of national income in 2013-14, up from 6.2% in [1982] [1983] (see Figure 6 ). This is the highest level recorded since the establishment of the India, 1922 India, -2014 Source: Authors' computations using tax and survey data and national accounts.
As expected, the top 0.1% income share dynamics exhibit a similar pattern in our benchmark scenario (see Figure 7) . 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 Per adult pretax national income. Systematic combination of tax, survey and national accounts data. Benchmark scenario displayed (A0B1C1D1).
Top 1 % income share in India : 1922 India : -2014 Looking at the 0.01% earners (Figure 8 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 Per adult pretax national income. Systematic combination of tax, survey and national accounts data. Benchmark scenario displayed (A0B1C1D1).
Top 0.1 % income share in India : 1922 India : -2014 3.2 Fall in Middle 40% and bottom 50% shares
We now turn to post-1951 results, which we have for the entire distribution of income. Figure 9 shows the mirror evolution of top 10% share in total income and middle 40% share (i.e. individuals above the bottom 50% earners and below the top 10%). In the mid-fifties, the top 10% and the middle 40% held about 40% of total income each, the share of the middle 40% progressively increased from the mid-fifties to 1982-83, reaching 46% of total income. It then decreased afterwards.
At the turn of the Millenium, the top 10% and the middle 40% groups captured exactly the same amount, 40%. However, by 2013-14, the middle 40% share had fallen to an historically low level of 29.6%. 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 Per adult pretax national income. Systematic combination of tax, survey and national accounts data. Benchmark scenario displayed (A0B1C1D1).
Top 0.01 % income share in India : 1922 India : -2014 Source: Authors' computations using tax and survey data and national accounts. Per adult pretax national income. Systematic combination of tax, survey and national accounts data. Benchmark scenario displayed (A0B1C1D1).
1951-2014
Top 10 % vs. Middle 40 % income shares in India Figure 10 -Bottom 50% income share: 1951-2014 Source: Authors' computations using tax and survey data and national accounts.
Total growth rates by income group
We compare total growth rates across the full distribution of incomes over the 1980-2014 period and compare these results in perspective to other countries available in the WID.world database, namely China, France and the USA. We also provide global growth estimates for the corresponding global groups. Appendix 10 shows the same results on an annual growth rate basis.
Unequal growth dynamics over the period are not specific to India. Income growth rises the higher up the income distribution one proceeds in China, in the USA and in France as well. India's dynamics are, however, striking: it is the country with the highest gap between the growth of the top 1% and growth of the full population. It is also interesting to note that bottom 50% of earners grew three times more slowly in China than in India, the middle 40% six times more slowly than their Chinese counterparts, but that the incomes of those at the very top of the Indian have grown at a faster pace than in China.
While Figure 11 is particularly meaningful from the perspective of individual growth dynamics, it is also useful to balance this with information on the share of total growth captured by different income groups (Figure 12 ). Indeed, income growth per adult growth can appear high for certain groups, but can represent little from the perspective of total growth at the country level. Our results show that the top 0.1% earners captured more total growth than the bottom 50% (12% vs.
11% of total growth) over the period. The top 0.1% of earners represented less than 800 000 individuals in 2013-14, this is equivalent to a population smaller to Delhi's IT suburb, Gurgaon. It is a sharp contrast with the 389 million individuals that made up the bottom half of the adult population in late 2013. At the opposite end of the distribution, the top 1% of Indian earners captured 29% of total growth, as much as the bottom 84%. The comparison of these figures with China and other countries is particularly noteworthy. Out of the four countries, India is the country where the middle 40% benefitted from the least from total growth over the period.
The bottom 50% however captured a similar share of total growth in India and in China (respectively 11% and 13%).
Figure 12 -Share of total national growth captured by different income groups, 1980-2014
Source: Authors' computations using tax and survey data and national accounts. Figure 13 plots the information presented in Figure 11 and in Figure 12 for the full distribution of income. the higher the group in the distribution of income, the lower the growth rate over the period. Real per adult income of the bottom 50% middle 40% groups grew substantially faster (respectively 87% and 74%) than average income (65%). On the contrary, top 0.1%, top 0.01% and top 0.001% income groups experienced a severe decrease in their real incomes (-26%, -42% and -45% respectively). Figure 16 reveals that bottom 50% group captured 28% of total growth over the 1951-1980 period, vs. 49% for the middle 40% and 24% for the top 10%. 20 Appendix 11 presents this data into average annual growth rates and Appendix 12 plots the total growth rate curve by percentile for this period. percentile, 1951-1980 Source: Authors' computations using tax and survey data and national accounts.
Income group
Figure 16 -Share of total growth captured by percentile groups, 1951-1980
Source: Authors' computations using tax and survey data and national accounts. Distribution of pre-tax income among adults. Estimates combine survey, fiscal and national accounts data.
Income group
Growing share of income gap explained by top incomes
We compare the theoretical fiscal income obtained from national accounts 21 to our reconstructed fiscal income and the total income estimated from household surveys. This comparison reveals the share of survey and national accounts discrepancy discussed in section 2.1.3, that can be attributed to the absence of top earners in survey data. We find that our reconstructed fiscal income bridges a growing and non-negligible gap between national accounts surveys data. The share of the gap explained by our reconstructed fiscal income rises from about 0% in 1990 to more than 28% in 2014.
Figure 17 -Importance of missing top incomes
Source: Authors' computations using tax and survey data and national accounts. 21 Supposed to be 70% of net national income, following Banerjee and Piketty (2005) In order to test the robustness of our results to data limitations (including the tax data gap of the 2000s and the growing gap between national accounts and consumption surveys), we present our results along the 54 estimation strategies described in section 2.2.6. These 54 scenarios reflect a wide range of alternative assumptions to make up for the lack of consistent data for the entire distribution of income. We find that our main results are robust to all the strategies tested. higher than what we obtain in our benchmark results.
Results for the middle 40% and the bottom 50% groups are relatively more sensitive to our sets of scenario assumptions, as Appendix 13 and Appendix 14. We find a 2.5 p.p. spread on lower case and upper case scenarios for middle 40%
shares on average and an average 8 p.p. spread for bottom 50% income shares. This spread is essentially due to assumptions on the savings profiles of lower consumption groups (strategies A0, A1, A2). The A0 scenario reflects a mid-range position between the 0 negative assumption (scenario A2) and the profiles obtained from the IHDS dataset, with arguably excessive negative savings rates 22 .
Long run results for bottom 40% and middle 50% groups are consistent across all scenarios: a slight increase from 1951-52 to 1983-84 and and a significant decrease afterwards.
To sum up, we see our set of alternative scenario assumptions as a way to shed light on the gaps in our current knowledge of Indian income inequality. Our results are robust to a wide range of alternative assumptions but we do not pretend that these new series are definitive. More modestly, we hope they can encourage the publication of full series from 2000 to 2010. All computer codes are provided in the data appendix of the paper and can be used to produce alternative strategies, if novel data addressing current gaps were to be released.
DISCUSSION
The mid-1980s turnaround
Our findings confirm and amplify the conclusions of Banerjee and Piketty (2005) on Indian inequality in the long run, namely i) a marked decrease in inequality in the early fourties ii) an even stronger reduction in top income shares in the 1950-70s and iii) a significant increase from the mid-eighties onwards.
Current income inequality in India is higher than during pre-independence period.
This holds true from the creation of the Income Tax in 1922 to independence in 22 We note particular divergences around between 1978 and 1983 for both middle 40% and bottom 50% shares. This is explained by the fact that from 1978 to 1983, as shown in Appendix 3, we do not have survey distributional data and we interpolate them on the basis of 1978 and 1983 information. The combination of interpolated survey income levels for these specific years and certain of our strategies -in particular strategy C3 (px1=80) and D3 (concave junction profile), tend to reduce "next 9%" income levels (ie. individuals above the bottom 90% but below the top 1%) and relatively increase levels of the bottom 90%. These 'extreme' scenarios are the less plausible of the set of assumptions in our view.
1947 when comparing the top 1% share of national income, but also for the pre-1922 period. Before 1922, the best available estimates show that the top 0.1% income share varied between 5 and 7% of national income vs. more than 8% today in our benchmark, conservative scenario.
We note that the reduction in top income shares was smaller during the interwar period than the reduction which occurred throughout the 1950-1970s.
This seems consistent with the interpretation posited for industrialized countries' (Piketty, 2001; Piketty and Saez, 2003 (Figure 18 ). Such evolutions may have reduced rent-seeking behavior at the top of the distribution via a process of discouragement, which in presence of excessive bargaining power and rent-seeking is the efficient thing to do (Piketty, Saez, Stantcheva, 2014) . 23 An anecdote may reflect this view on fairness which prevailed in Nehruvian politics: when industrialist Tata asked then Prime Minister J. Nerhu about allowing profits in Stata-owned industries, J. Nehru answered, "Never talk to me about profit, [...] , it is a dirty word" (Das, 2000) . 24 14 banks were nationalized, representing 70% of the sector. 25 These figures include the "super tax" on top incomes. India, 1948 India, -2016 Source: Authors' computations using Government of India data. Top marginal income tax rate in India : 1948 India : -2016 year. However, the fact that the rise in inequality is prolonged throughout the 1990s and in the recent period shows that this factor is very unlikely to play decisive role in the observed trends.
Figure 18 -Top marginal income tax rate in
Available macro series also show that the wage share in the private corporate sector has been declining in India since the early to mid-1980s (in contrast to the 1970s, when the profit share was declining; see Nagaraj (2000) and Tendulkar (2003) , which is consistent with the time for the turnaround proposed here.
Our results are also consistent with the evolution of Indian wealth inequality according to All-India Debt and Investment survey data (Anand and Thampi, 2017) . Recently released wealth inequality estimates indeed show a sharp increase in wealth concentration from 1991 to 2012, particularly after 2002. The increase in wealth inequality at the top of the distribution is a logical outcome of the highly unequal income growth we report in this paper over the recent period.
4.2
Shining India for the rich mostly?
Our results shed light on a particularly striking characteristic of Indian growth over the past three decades: the very moderate rise of the "middle class" -at least defined as individuals above median income and below the top 10% earners. Incomes of the middle 40% grew at 102% over the 1980-2014 period.
Compared to industrialized countries' growth rates for this group, the figure is impressive. In the Indian context however, the middle 40% were notably below average growth (187%). Since 1980, the middle 40% group in India captured a much smaller share of total growth (25%) in than its counterparts did in China or Europe (more than 40%) or even the USA (33%). This result should help us better characterize what has been termed as "the rise of India's middle class". From the perspective or our newly income inequality dataset, "Shining India" corresponds to the top 10% of the population (approximately 80 million adult individuals in 2014) rather than the middle 40%. Relatively speaking, the shining decades for the middle 40% group corresponded to the 1951-1980 period, when this group captured a much higher share of total growth (49%) than it did over the past forty years. It is also important to stress that, since the early 1980s, growth has been highly unevenly distributed within the top 10% group. This further reveals the unequal nature of liberalization and deregulation processes. India in fact comes out as a country with one of the highest increase in top 1% income share concentration over the past thirty years.
CONCLUSION
We combine historical and novel tax data with household surveys and national accounts data in order to produce the novel estimates of the full distribution of adult pre-tax income in India, from 1951 to 2014 and for the top 1% of the distribution from 1922 to 2014.
We document a large increase in the level of inequality in India over the recent period and a large increase in the current level as compared to survey-based statistics generally used in public debates. We find that our results are robust to a large set of alternative estimation strategies addressing important data gaps.
According to our benchmark estimates, the top 1% income share is at its highest We certainly do not have the capacity to put an end to debates over the impact of economic reforms on inequality or poverty India. Our contribution is in fact relatively modest; better data series on the distribution of income inequality can and should lead to better informed democratic conversation on the state of the Indian economy. We stress the need for more research dedicated to reconcile micro and macro estimates of income and consumption inequality in India. Efforts following the Distributional National Accounts Guidelines (Alvaredo et al., 2016) , published on the WID.world database, seek to go in this direction. Ultimately, meeting this objective will not be possible without the participation and expertise of official statistical agencies, in India and elsewhere. Distribution of pre-tax income among adults. Estimates combine survey, fiscal and national accounts data.
